

# CONCORDIA

Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie • Revista Internacional de Filosofía  
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**Rolf Kühn**

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Entrevista

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“La modernidad se ha convertido en un culto exclusivo  
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**Gabriele Münnix (Düsseldorf)**

**MULTIPERSPECTIVISM, INTERCULTURALITY  
AND PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION<sup>1</sup>**

In his epochal novel “Ulysses”, James Joyce describes a day in the life of an Irishman on his way to finding himself (and back to his wife), parallel to the wanderings of Odysseus, as he is called in Greek, on his way back home: for instance the temptation of the Homeric sirens is represented here by Dublin bar girls, and the giant Polyphemus also has a counterpart: the one-eyed Cyclops in the cave is represented here by a giant being called “The Citizen” in a pub, who is restricted to his own Irish nationalist views of the world<sup>2</sup> and is therefore limited and easily deceived, like Polyphemus in Homer.

**1. Blindness – literally and metaphorically**

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida also dealt with the phenomenon of blindness, in a literal and a metaphorical sense, taking up the example of the Cyclops:

In the introduction to his “Mémoires d'aveugle”, Derrida calls for “L'ouvre ou ne pas voir”, playing with the double sense of the phrase; it is not simply an invitation to visit the Louvre, where he had organized an exposition with paintings on blindness, but also to open ourselves up to what and where (“où”) we do not see. Derrida, in his accompanying text, also gives the example of Polyphemus, the “narcissus cyclops” whose “fixity” is “monocular” and who, in Homer, is easy to blind and fool despite his giant strength. Of course, with our two eyes, we are supposed to be more agile and less restricted than Polyphemus.<sup>3</sup> But Derrida's comments concern yet another form of blindness, that of which we all are victims, even though we think we see. This blindness is due to the phenomenon of the “blind spot”. It is a phenomenon that lies within our vision, but does not reach our awareness.

Merleau-Ponty had used this metaphor in his *Phenomenology of Perception* as well. This “blind spot” in our eyes is due to the physiological configuration of the eye's retina, where there is a place without visual cells, as the optic nerve leads from here to the brain. We are unaware of this handicap because we have two eyes and our brain has learned to interpolate. We do not see that we cannot see at this very spot. So this blindness can be called central as well as transcen-

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<sup>1</sup> Invited lecture at the EIFI conference „Intercultural Encounters and Research Exchange“, Prague, 22.11.24.

<sup>2</sup> James Joyce, *Ulysses*, München 1977, p. 329-388.

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Aufzeichnungen eines Blinden*, München 1997, p.38.

dental, for it is the very condition for our being able to see at all. We are unaware of it, but the fact that we are not able to see from *where* we are looking enables us to transfer a physiological phenomenon to the very process of knowing.<sup>4</sup>

Merleau-Ponty is referring here to Husserl, who, in his work on “The Crisis of European Sciences”, criticized the “objectivist appearance” of sciences. All of us, scientists included, start from physiological and mental points of view<sup>5</sup> that impose on us a place (physical or mental) from which we look at the world, and these epistemological preconditions are often treated lightly because they seem either unimportant or valid for everyone. They stay in the background of our consciousness. We are unaware of the backgrounds and preconditions of our views on the world.

They are a “background phenomenon” in Whorf’s sense of the term, for just as the grammatical structures of mother tongues have an effect on the mental representations of speakers, so our own intercultural understanding is in danger of taking for universal what is dependent on certain forms of language and culture. (Whorf calls this “natural logic”).<sup>6</sup> This leads us, unwittingly, to start from what is customary to us, and then to project it onto the external world and expect it to be accepted by others. This will at best be interpreted by that other side as a hegemonic appetite and more rarely as stupidity or naivety (which, in fact, it is).

But the absolutization of a single perspective - namely, one’s own - can permanently block mutual understanding and recognition, we are blind to other perspectives which would help to widen our cognition of the world.

For me, there’s yet another and different kind of blindness from that of the blind spot (which lies in the background of our view) and which we have to distinguish from the first sort of blindness where we do not see the point from where we are looking at the world. Take, for example, Popper’s comparison between knowing consciousness, its intentionality, its orientation, and a spotlight shining on objects of knowledge at the centre of our interests<sup>7</sup> and illuminating them powerfully, so that other parts to the sides will inevitably remain in the dark: for instance the concerns which are not central to our interests and expectations. They will remain hidden to our image regions: Entire sectors - outside our perspectives - will remain in the shadows, invisible. Or to use another opti-

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<sup>4</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, Berlin 1966, p.117.

<sup>5</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, §2 criticizes the so-called „positivistic reduction“ and „objectivistic appearance“ of science and its loss of relevance for practical life.

<sup>6</sup> Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality; Sprache, Denken, Wirklichkeit*, Hamburg 1972, p. 9-13.

<sup>7</sup> Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge, Objektive Erkenntnis*, Hamburg 1974, p. 369ff.

cal metaphor, they are – as we express it in several languages - in our “dead angles” (“angles morts”, “tote Winkel”): invisible, although just beside us. This sort of blindness is not central and transcendental, but a sort of (unconscious) side effect in the process of directing our attention to certain phenomena. They are the necessary consequence of concentrating and focusing our interests on certain objects, and are among the phenomena of perception I would like to examine here.

## 2. Perspectivism

The history of perspectivism in Western philosophy begins with Euclid and the reflections of Greek mathematicians, philosophers and physicians, to explain the process of vision. His theory was taken up and modified in medieval Arab philosophy by Al-Kindi (in “De aspectibus”).<sup>8</sup> At that time there was a theological quarrel in Arab and Greek philosophy – also a piece of intercultural difference from which we can learn - about the activity and/or passivity of seeing, and correspondingly about freedom of will and predestination). Having reached Europe via “El Andalus” in Spain, Al Kindi’s theory became the basis for the invention of the “central perspective” during the Renaissance which was a way of representing things optically, for instance in paintings, according to the laws of (active) human vision.<sup>9</sup>

Perspective thus became not only a matter of optics, but also a mainspring of art; to paint “according to the laws of human vision” required the study of perspective. Things are now represented - at least in Europe - in accordance with the laws of human perception. The knowledge of reality was then thought of in terms of the subject's point of view, prompting the turning point of the Renaissance and once again placing man (and women of course) at the centre.<sup>10</sup>

Cusanus - at the threshold of Renaissance - was already engaged in this kind of perspectival thinking.<sup>11</sup> In *De Visione Dei*, for example, he compares the vision of God (seeing and being seen) to a portrait whose eyes follow the viewer wherever (s)he goes. God would thus see and be seen by each individual differently, depending on the point of view the individual adopts to look at God<sup>12</sup>, and each person feels that God looks exclusively at them and nobody else.

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<sup>8</sup> David Lindbergh, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler; Auge und Licht im Mittelalter. Die Entwicklung der Optik von Al Kindi bis Kepler*, Frankfurt 1987, p. 18f.

<sup>9</sup> more explicitly see in Gabriele Münnix, *Das Bild vom Bild*, Freiburg 2019, p.195-199.

<sup>10</sup> See Hans Belting, *Florenz und Bagdad, eine Geschichte des west-östlichen Blicks*, München 2008, p. 262.

<sup>11</sup> See Nicola d Cusa, *Docta Ignorantia* II 11/161 and Norbert Herold, *Menschliche Perspektive und Wahrheit*, Münster 1975, p. 31-34.

<sup>12</sup> Nicola de Cusa, *De Visione Dei*, Praefatio 3, 6-16.

Later, Leibniz introduced the concept of perspective into philosophy by his monadology, as it evokes the different representations of a single object: “Each soul represents the universe according to its point of view”, and he linked this to the fact that each of these monads would be a living mirror.<sup>13</sup> “Perspective” thus entered the heart of philosophical thought, helping to reformulate the way in which man situates him/herself in the world.

Leibniz, in his *Monadology*, was the first to use the word “perspective” figuratively, introducing it to philosophy:

“It is thus the point of view that determines the degree of (limited) knowledge, since perception cannot clearly express all the diversity of the universe. And since all monads have internal differences, they are individual, and thus so-called “small perceptions” (which are blurred and less clear) are variations of that which is only at the horizons of our perceptions, which can no longer be distinguished, and which is also different for each monad.”<sup>14</sup>

This caught the interest of Nietzsche, who abandoned Leibniz's metaphysical precondition of “pre-established harmony”, and radicalized perspectivism and subjectivism:

Under the title “In Prison” he wrote:

“My eye, whether piercing or weak, cannot see beyond a certain space, and in this space I live and act; this horizon line is my nearest destiny, great or small, *from which I cannot escape*. A concentric circle extends around each being, with a centre of its own. Just as the ear encloses us in a small space, so does touch. From these horizons, in which our senses enclose each of us *as if within the walls of a prison*, we then measure the world, calling this near and that far, this large and that small, this hard and that soft: these measurements we call sensations - and all this, absolutely all of it, is an error in itself! [...] The habits of our senses have enveloped us in a web of misleading sensations, which in turn form the basis of all our judgments and our 'understanding' - there is absolutely no way out, no escape, no circuitous path to the real world! We're in our web like spiders, and whatever we can catch in it, it will always be only that which lets itself be caught in our web.”<sup>15</sup>

We can, however, escape Nietzsche's radical, dead-end subjectivism, which was a polemic against rationalism and seemingly objective science, just as we can escape an exclusively subjective perspective (cf. Gadamer: “Horizons can change to those who move”<sup>16</sup>). And our scientific models provide us with con-

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<sup>13</sup> Leibniz, *Monadologie*, Stuttgart 1998, § 56, 63, 83.

<sup>14</sup> Leibniz, *Monadologie*, §60.

<sup>15</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Morgenröte*, § 117 (Schlechta (ed), *Werke*, Bd I, Darmstadt 1997, p.1009 f).

<sup>16</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method, Wahrheit und Methode I*, Tübingen 1975, p.307.

tacts with the “real world”, since otherwise - an example from Popper - we would not be able to regenerate lakes and repopulate them with fish<sup>17</sup>, and scientific theories would remain without useful applications – such as Einstein's theory of relativity which led us to GPS and the cell phone. And pharmaceutical research has made it possible to combat serious diseases. Contrary to Nietzsche's radical subjectivism there *are* ways into the real world, and in contact with reality we can even modify it to our advantage!

But for Nietzsche, there are only subjective representations of the world, and it would not even be possible to know ourselves: “we are eternally condemned to suffer this law: ‘Each is a stranger to himself’, - with regard to ourselves we are not among those who can ‘seek knowledge.’”<sup>18</sup>

We have therefore come to take into account the individual pole of perception, which brings us back to Merleau-Ponty.

The relationship between man and the world is an open dialogue. In perception, it is man who speaks to the world, but the world also speaks to man. Men and women, with their five senses, interpret the world and question the world, which is made up entirely of meaning. The world answers, but the question anticipates the answer.(which reminds us of Nietzsche's spider).

How can we free ourselves from the cobweb we have spun around ourselves? By recognizing and learning from perspectives other than our own.

### **3. Multiperspectivism**

Also in scientific disciplines do we need to recognize other perspectives: as Feyerabend describes it, who wants a “pluralism of methods”<sup>19</sup>, as for example the hegemony of “academic” Western medicine can only win if we see alternative views, whether from homeopathy, or traditional Chinese or Indian medicine.<sup>20</sup> In any case, we need to experiment with different views in medicine to overcome the simplified mechanistic model of explaining physical processes and healing.

Changes in perspective are therefore needed, both in interdisciplinary work and in the learning of interculturality, which is becoming increasingly important in the face of globalization and multiethnic populations in many countries. Intercultural learning is central to widen one's knowledge about other traditions of thought and in the long run will prevent the violence of those that do not feel recognized. And, in times of globalization, it is necessary to tackle global pro-

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<sup>17</sup> Karl R. Popper, *Ich weiß, dass ich nichts weiß, und kaum das*, Bonn 1991.

<sup>18</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Stuttgart 1976, p.239f.

<sup>19</sup> Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method, Wider den Methodenzwang*, Frankfurt 1986, p. 18f.

<sup>20</sup> Paul Feyerabend, *Erkenntnis für freie Menschen*, Frankfurt 1980, p. 97.

blems like the climate crisis in a common endeavour, both interdisciplinary and intercultural.

But are these three sorts of changes of perspective which I want to recommend possible at all?

In an article that caused quite a stir (about “What is it like to be a Bat?” from 1974), the American philosopher Thomas Nagel dealt with the psyche of the other, and drew what he considered to be an insurmountable boundary: even if we are able to describe the neural mechanisms of another person or being with precision, we cannot have access to the inner subjectivity of another being<sup>21</sup>. The existential situation of the other is unique, cannot be exchanged, cannot be shared with outsiders, and cannot be judged by them. We cannot know what it *is* to *be* or feel like someone else, for instance like a bat with ultrasound perception or a colourblind person. We can only try to imagine.

We cannot imagine the subjective (and corporeal) nature of someone else's sensual experience, and have only the resources of our own consciousness or professional experience at our disposal, which are ill-suited to such a task. However, we can come close, as the same Thomas Nagel shows in a book he later wrote. In “The view from nowhere”, where he speaks of *ultraobjectivity*.<sup>22</sup> This “ultraobjectivity” consists in gradually detaching oneself more and more from subjective perspectives, thus achieving an increasingly better knowledge of what is thought.

But Feyerabend, with his arguments against methodological dogmatism in sciences (in his book “Cognition for Free Men”) does not see the sciences as common endeavours. This is why - in my book on postmodernism - I had the idea of proposing a concept of multiperspectivity - a scheme that accounts for the different perspectives in favour of progress in cognition.<sup>23</sup> The model should enable three levels of perspective change to be based on one another, and can be transformed didactically<sup>24</sup> - which is also essential for understanding better the multicultural situation in many countries. A better understanding of the traditions of different cultures will help to prevent violence.

1°) Let's get started with my first level: I believe that a first form of intersubjectivity or interdisciplinarity occurs when we try to adopt the perspective of another person or another methodological approach (Anne Koch has suggested

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<sup>21</sup> Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to be A Bat? Philosophical Review 84/4, p.435-450.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Der Blick von Nirgendwo, Frankfurt 1993.


<sup>23</sup> Gabriele Münnix, Zum Ethos der Pluralität, 3. Aufl. Münster 2020, p.182-184.

<sup>24</sup> S. Gabriele Münnix, Nietzsches Idee einer Experimentalphilosophie: Multiperspektivität und praktisches Philosophieren, in: Rohbeck (Hg.), Jahrbuch für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik Nr. 15 („Experimentelles Philosophieren und Philosophiedidaktik“), Dresden 2014, p. 186-198.

that, through “simulative hermeneutics” and the use of an iterative process, this kind of experience can improve understanding).<sup>25</sup> This exchange between two perspectives will lead to more self-knowledge as well.

For we can then hope to move on to the external vision or positions of our own self, thereby illuminating the “blind spots” referred to earlier by Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, the viewpoints from where we look at the world. In contrast we can become aware of what we tend to accept for ourselves as self-evident. In any case, we must also strive to understand the other’s language or speciality, in order to become truly aware of our own specificity and difference from the other. So this mutual exchange will be fruitful for both sides.

Graphic 1 (© Münnix 2003)




However, an undifferentiated acceptance of all possible perspectives and viewpoints is not enough. The challenge is to understand from within, to expand one's own knowledge, to constantly confront us with the new and the foreign. This is “self-transcendence”, and it requires us to develop our aesthetic and “moral” sensibility, so as to make understanding an operation of transsubjectivity. This will remove the “alienating” character from others. And it is the first step towards avoiding blindness and understanding the presuppositions of our own thinking.

2°) The second phase, which builds on the first, occurs when several subjects, from different perspectives and together (in a kind of concerted action), examine and discuss an object of knowledge. (For this to be fruitful, these other perspectives must not be too foreign, there have to be overlappings so that we can notice them, otherwise they will fall outside the focus). Broadening the point of view has the advantage of eliminating the dead angles outside and just beside our perspectives or spotlights, illuminating areas that would otherwise remain more or less inaccessible if we stuck to the specialities of our own views.

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<sup>25</sup> Anne Koch, *Das Verstehen des Fremden*, Darmstadt 2005, argumentiert mit einer simulativen Hermeneutik und iterierten Gedankenexperimenten, die sich auf der Basis von Quines „Word and Object“ um verbesserte Einfühlung bemühen.

Graphic 2 (© Münnix 2003)



We gain in knowledge - we could speak of knowledge as a “joint venture” - because the experience of others is valued and integrated into our own world-view, and we have already learnt to learn from other perspectives. But we can learn here from Jain perspectivism that not all perspectives are equally good and fruitful.<sup>26</sup> Some might be too far away, some too near, and we have to check and discuss them among each other using the first level of changing perspectives.

In terms of interculturality, we could, for example, learn to better understand the different representations we have of fundamental human rights (In Islam, for instance dying within the family circle is a fundamental right; or the right to work is enshrined in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights different from the UN version). On the other hand it is more difficult for us to conceive of the right of retaliation and the role of women.<sup>27</sup> And in dealing with possible solutions of the climate crisis we have to take into account that there are different conceptions of “Nature” in different traditions of thought (dualistic, animistic, holistic, for instance), and even different ideals of acting or not acting, as I have outlined in several publications.<sup>28</sup>

3°) If we are prepared for this “self-transcendence” as an individual or as a culture, we can speak of “transdisciplinarity” and “transculturality”, going beyond the frontiers of our self, which brings me to the third phase of broadening our horizons, and this can be seen as a target:

The enrichment that occurs if cooperation is successful between single perspectives and experiences of the other, will be normal – as it is already normal in scientific work. Combining them for broader knowledge, will make it possible to enlarge our horizons. To accompany this widening of horizons of

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
<sup>26</sup> Himlal Trikha, *Perspektivismus und Kritik. Das pluralistische Erkenntnismodell der Jainas*, Wien 2012.

<sup>27</sup> See Johan Galtung, *Menschenrechte – anders gesehen*, Frankfurt 1997.

<sup>28</sup> See Werner Busch /Gabriele Münnix/Bernd Rolf (Hg), *Philosophy and Environmental Education*, Nordhausen 2004, with contributions from 17 countries.

knowledge (Gadamer: “fusion of horizons”) will lead us to better overviews, by the accession to increasingly rising, ever higher points of view. This will be all the richer as the enriched perspectivist horizon is vaster and the perspectivist possibilities as well : In rising to higher points of view (just as in Marc Aurel’s recommended mental exercise of “a bird’s flight”<sup>29</sup>) we can see how things correlate and widen our knowledge.

Graphic 3 (© Münnix 2003)



In conclusion, let's return to Derrida's quotation at the start of this talk: “L'ouvre où ne pas voir”. We can overcome the blindness caused by our withdrawal into our own perspectives, both individual and scientific, if we open up to other ways of representing and interpreting the world, if we seriously seek to understand them. We learn to see differently: what matters is not only the self-image as reflected by the perspective of others (e.g. the exogenous view of Western thought structures<sup>30</sup>), but also the progress and useful contributions to self-knowledge and science that result from our questioning of what we took for granted, from our becoming attentive to fields and domains in other cultures hitherto sidelined, from opening them up to reflection, and finally from elevating ourselves to higher insights. And this is of course an ongoing process.

#### **4. Interculturality and Philosophical Education**

In his “Zarathustra”, Nietzsche describes the ascent to a lofty city called “colourful cow” that can be confidently compared to the multicultural situation in many of our cities.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Pierre Hadot, *Philosophie als Lebensform*, Berlin 1991, p.34f refers to Marc Aurel’s self reflections, ( *Selbstbetrachtungen*, Zürich 1974, XII, 24,3 and IX, 30, 1.

<sup>30</sup> See Gabriele Münnix, *Kontradiktion und Komplementarität. Ist die Logik universal?*, in: Bickmann et al.(Hg.), *Tradition und Traditionsbruch. Zwischen Skepsis und Dogmatik*, Studien zur interkulturellen Philosophie Bd 16, Amsterdam New York 2016, p. 265-280.

<sup>31</sup> Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 307, Berlin 2015 (ed Holzinger).

The ascent provides ever-better overall perspectives, and, beyond the **multi-**perspectivity, enables a kind of **multicultural overview** as a target perspective (Nietzsche's eagle can rise above everything as well<sup>32</sup>); and so we can gain more understanding and knowledge of other cultures.

And this is where the aspect of philosophical education comes into play: For a long time – in public opinion, but also in teaching at schools and universities – philosophy has been a European endeavour.

However, it is important to go beyond this Eurocentric position, in order to better understand other cultural traditions, as well as to perceive and better understand other traditions of thought.

They are not foreign and far away, but represented within our societies which is why we have to foster intercultural dialogue in education as well in order to gain a wider and deeper understanding of other world views in other cultural traditions. And in times of globalization we can no longer restrict ourselves to European thought traditions.

Ram Mall, the founding president of the German Society for Intercultural Philosophy, speaks of “three birthplaces of philosophy”: not only in ancient Greece, but also in India and China, the breakthrough to philosophical thinking happened at about the same time at least in three places.<sup>33</sup>

Karl Jaspers called this the “axis time”, and in his “Great Philosophers” he had also dealt extensively with the Indian (Buddhist) philosopher Nagarjuna.<sup>34</sup> Today we know about Arabic and African philosophy, about the Liberation philosophy in South America, and, above all, we know much more about Asian philosophy, not just since Heidegger's interest in Daoism.<sup>35</sup>

It is important, enriching and enlightening, and should be a central part of philosophical education in schools and universities, to learn more about other traditions of thought and to gain a better understanding of them. My three stages of perspective changes can describe stages of progression and inspire ways of didactic implementation. In the age of globalization (with all its nationalist backlashes<sup>36</sup>), philosophy should not remain Eurocentric but should rise above it.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ram Adhar Mall Heinz Hülsmann, *Drei Geburtsorte der Philosophie: China, Indien, Europa*, Bonn 1989.

<sup>34</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Die großen Philosophen I*, München 1957, p. 326-348.

<sup>35</sup> See Fabian Heubel, *Gewundene Wege nach China. Heidegger – Daoismus – Adorno*, Frankfurt 2020.

<sup>36</sup> See Robertsons notion of „glocalization“ which describes a dialectical movement of globalization and re-localization. Roland Robertson, *Globalization*, in: M. Featherstone et al (ed.), *Global Modernities*, London 1995, p.145.

But this is not only important within philosophy: in times of war and climate refugees, it would also help if, for lack of other knowledge, one's own culture were not only seen as the epitome of sophistication and the other, the foreign, as primitive and uncultivated. In sciences, intercultural cooperation has long been the norm. But with Waldenfels we can see that despite familiarity in everyday life, for example through working together, abysses of alienation between cultures, i.e. between their representatives, can repeatedly open up.<sup>37</sup>

If we could also succeed in recognizing perspectives other than our own in everyday life and appreciating them as enriching, this would not only be a form of preventing violence, but also an enormous step forward in knowledge that would help to better overcome international problems such as the already mentioned climate catastrophe. And this cannot be done alone, but only together.

At the end I would like to come back to another giant in Greek mythology, perhaps a counter image to that of the one-eyed Polyphemus:

The giant Argus was employed by Zeus' wife Hera, in order to prevent the numerous love affairs of Zeus. « Argus' eyes » seemed very apt to do so, because he had 100 eyes all over his body, of which only two (and always a different pair of them) were sleeping from time to time, the others were constantly awake and attentive and able to learn from many perspectives what was going on. Perhaps Nietzsche (who was very acquainted with Greek mythology) with his target of « seeing with 1000 eyes »<sup>38</sup> was inspired from here. But his perspectivism ends up in relativism, whereas my conception does not do so. We can always improve understanding in ongoing historical and social processes.

In any case, in a globalized world with many cultures represented within one state we can no longer afford blinded citizens that see only their own concerns. We should start to already educate children to recognize and understand different points of view.

Only together will we be able to tackle international problems and gain more understanding. And philosophical/ethical education in this broader sense cannot start early enough. It has to be organized at all levels of education, at schools and universities.

AIPPh, as an international organization of teachers of philosophy at schools and universities, has devoted itself to this very target, giving and discussing examples of how this can be successfully done<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> Bernhard Waldenfels, *Kulturelle und soziale Fremdheit*, in: Schneider/Mall/Lohmar (eds.), *Einheit und Vielfalt, Das Verstehen der Kulturen, Studien zur interkulturellen Philosophie* 9, Amsterdam/Atlanta 1998, p. 13-36.

<sup>38</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Aufzeichnungen aus der Zeit der Morgenröte und der fröhlichen Wissenschaft*, Musarion München 1924, Vol. XI, p. 138 f.

<sup>39</sup> Gabriele Münnix is honorary president of this association.

Whether in the field of scientific research, or in tackling the climate catastrophe, or in peace negotiations: we can no longer afford to generalize our own views and hold them to be universal. And of course, it would enrich our knowledge of philosophical traditions in other cultures and create more understanding of otherness.